Elenchus

A Periodical of the Department of Political Science
Handique Girls' College

India in the world & Beyond

About the Elenchus

Elenchus is the Socratic method, also known as method of Elenchus elenctic method, or Socratic debate, is a form of cooperative argumentative dialogue between individuals, based on asking and answering questions to stimulate critical thinking and to draw out ideas and underlying presuppositions. So we find it to be a suitable name for the periodical of Political Science Department. The periodical is theme based. In the first volume we have started with the theme Migration and 2nd volume was on the theme Democracy and the third volume is on International Relation and the next Volume will be on North East. This is our humble attempt to provide a platform to the scholars, academicians, and to our students to place their views and to stimulate their thinking in order to express themselves with this being a medium. We apologise for any unwanted mistakes.

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Editorial Note

International relations is a phenomenon based on international strategies and diplomatic maneuvers that expand mutual activities around the world. This is made possible by advancements in technology, socio-economic dynamics, politics, and environmental shifts, all of which have increased worldwide communication. The world continues to integrate and grow as a result of technological advancements and digital dynamics.

It's a dicey time to try to deal with global issues. Brexit, Iran, and Trump's trade battle with China have sparked political and economic unrest, posing a challenge to international relations by triggering a worldwide economic backlash in traditionally dominant economies.

Despite the fact that international relations may appear to be a foreign idea, they affect every member of society. The decisions taken at the international level influence the different aspects of individual's life: whether you buy fair trade products, your religion, your cultural background, where you live, and what you own. It goes beyond peace and war, poverty and business.

Knowledge and abilities in international relations enable you to

analyse and navigate global affairs through the complex and frequently subversive layer of influences. This paradigm examines how it affects both established and emerging economies, as well as gives an idea about how to respond to these complexities. Transferable abilities in history, politics, analysis, and research are taught in international relations. These abilities enable you to critically assess the modern world and analyse the shifting complexities that occur in politics on a regular basis.

These abilities have the ability to broaden career prospects and provide insight into how and why people from homogeneous and heterogeneous groups interact in particular ways. International relations skills are becoming increasingly valuable as a result of global uncertainty. Technology continues to transcend borders, bringing people from all walks of life closer together. We live in a world that is interdependent, and seeing it through a global lens can help you see things differently in the future.

Articles in this volume are an attempt to look into the India's relation with other nations and how fast space is becoming an integral part of grand strategic calculations and power projection capacities and also the articles highlight on a few redeeming features of public policy.

China and India's Grand Strategy in Space

Dr. Namrata Goswami

The relevance of space to China and India's grand strategy has never been more acute. Both are major powers in Asia and both aspire to Great Power status. China and India are forecasted to become the number 1 (China) and number 2 (India) economy by 2050 as per the *World in 2050* report by Price Waterhouse Cooper (PwC).[1] China's military budget was around $208 billion (2020) as per open-source reporting.[2] India's military budget was $65.86 billion (2020).[3] Included within this military budget is space military related expenditure of which the figures are not clear. China spends about $8.9 billion (2020) on its civilian space program annually[4] whereas India's spends around $1.3 billion (2020) annually on its civilian space program.[5] Both China and India possess advanced space capacity to include launch, spaceports, satellite manufacture, the utilization of satellites for weather forecasting, navigation, remote sensing, communications, tele-education, tele-medicine, and space science missions. Both have successfully entered Mars orbit [India-2014; China-2021] with China going further with a Mars landing and sending out a rover. Both view space as a critical component of their military space strategy, to include Anti-Satellite (ASAT) weapons, military command

and control (CnC), reconnaissance and geo-spatial intelligence, and Nuclear Command, Control and Communications (NC3). The ubiquitous contribution of space to civilian infrastructure to include ATM transactions, credit card transactions, internet, Global Positioning System (GPS), e-commerce, e-banking, create a social and political context where space plays a critical role in the everyday life of citizens. This aspect has been highlighted by both Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping.

It is in the context of the growing relevance of space to China and India that this article specifies the influence of grand strategic thinking on the space policies and missions of both countries. The article highlights the space capacities (civilian, military and commercial) of China and India. It concludes by specifying the growing strategic relevance of space to China and India's strategic thinking, as well as their power projection capacities.

Grand Strategy

All states that exist in the international system are shaped and motivated by their own unique grand strategies. Paul van Hooft defines grand strategy as "the highest level of national statecraft that establishes how states, or other political units, prioritize and mobilize which military, diplomatic, political, economic, and other sources of power to ensure what they perceive as their interests. Depending on one's theoretical perspective, these perceived interests focus the most minimal goal of ensuring the state's survival, pursuing specific domestic interests or ideational coalitions, or establishing a specific regional or global order".[6] Consequently, the grand strategic aspirations of China and India will be determined by the theoretical model that they adopt (realism/ liberalism/constructivism). Critically, grand strategic choices are determined by a nation's strategic and political culture. I define strategic culture as a sum of a nation's assumptions about its reality (threats, opportunities) based on which certain policy choices are preferred over others.[7] These policy choices are informed by the state's political culture,

reflecting both continuity and change over time. Political culture is defined as "a short-hand expression for a 'mindset' which has the effect of *limiting attention* [emphasis added] to less than the full range of alternative behavior, problems and solutions which are logically possible."[8] It is through the lens of grand strategy, strategic and political culture that the space goals and capacities of China and India are formulated and operationalized.

China's Space Goals

China has articulated several long-term space goals (2021-2049). These goals include permanent presence in Low Earth Orbit(LEO)) with its Tiangong space station, building Space Based Solar Power Satellites (SBSP) in Geosynchronous Equatorial Orbit (GEO), building reusable rockets, establishing a lunar research base in collaboration with Russia, and develop capacity to extract space-based resources to include asteroid mining, and deep space probes.[9] China's space goals reflect its grand strategic thinking of utilizing space for comprehensive national power and space power projection capacities. Drawing lessons from the past when the Ming dynasty stifled maritime innovation that resulted in the burning of *Zheng He*'s treasure ships in 1525 AD, China is focused at building space access across the Celestial Lines of Communication (CLoCs) with innovation becoming a priority area propelled by the "Made in China' policy 2025. China is focused at developing its cislunar (area between Earth and Moon), presence to create conditions of strategic advantage at the Earth-Moon Lagrange points, and at the same time, build, develop and refine its military space capacity. There is an increasing focus from China's space institutions to develop capacity for in situ manufacturing and resource utilization within a long-drawn-out timeline of 2021-2050.

China's Civilian, Military and Commercial Space Capacity

China's space goals are supported by a concerted development of its civilian and military space capacity. China has one of the most

advanced lunar programs that has demonstrated lunar soft landing, a landing on the far side of the Moon (2019), and lunar sample return mission (2020). In February and May 2021, China's first independent Mars mission, *Tianwen*, entered Mars orbit and then landed on Mars surface and sent out a rover. In June 2020, China established its own independent GPS, the Beidou navigation System, sold as an alternative to the U.S. Space Force's GPS. With this capacity, China can not only augment its civilian space infrastructure but also develop military space capacity with independent missile warning, tracking and guidance system as well as military CnC.[10]China established its first state funded SBSP plant in Chongqing in January 2019.[11]The Chongqing Collaborative Innovation Research Institute for Civil-Military Integration (CCIRICMI)in Southwestern China in partnerships with Chongqing University, the China Academy of Space Technology (CAST)'s Xi'an Branch in Shaanxi province, and Xidian University are collaborating on SBSP technology development to include wireless transmission of power and construction of large SBSP satellites in GEO.[12]China is also investing in its space launch capacity with its latest rocket the *Long March 5*capable of launching 14 metric tons to GEO, 25 tons to Low Earth orbit (LEO), and 8.2 tons to trans lunar injection. China is developing the *Long March 9*, its super heavy lifter, designed to carry a payload of 140 metric tons to LEO, a 50-ton spacecraft to a lunar transfer orbit and a 44-ton payload to Mars transfer orbit.[13]

    The military aspects of China's space program become clear when you trace the institutional structure of space decision making. It is the State Administration on Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (SASTIND) which functions under the direction of the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology (MIIT) that directs China's space program with the China National Space Administration (CNSA) directly under it.[14] In 2007, China tested its Anti-Satellite (ASAT) capability that included the HQ-19 surface to air missile, which was tested again in 2010, the DN-2 (2013) and the DN-3 (2015, 2016, 2017).[15]The SC-19 modeled on the DF-21C ballistic missile is China's

primary ASAT weapon, ranging between 2, 150kms-2, 500 kms.[16]China's space station hub, *Tianhe*, and its auxiliary lab, *Wentian,* to be launched next year, have a robotic arm that can be utilized for grabbing an enemy satellite as well.[17]Critically, under President Xi Jinping's modernization and institutionalization drive, China established the PLA Strategic Support Force in 2015 that coordinates space, cyber and psychological operations.[18] Under Xi, China has also boosted its commercial space sector, which was made of priority in 2014 when the State Council of the Communist Party of China (CPC) released their Document 60 to encourage China's private space sector.[19] Consequently, Chinese space startup, Onespacebecame the first Chinese company to successfully launch to sub-orbit.[20] In August 2019, Linkspace experimented with the first of China's reusable launch vehicle, when its rocket reached a height of 300 meters above ground and then landed back intact.[21]Beijing Interstellar Glory Space Technology Ltd or ispace launched its rocket *Hyperbola 1* into orbit in July 2019, marking the first such successful orbital launch by a Chinese private company.[22]ispace is aspiring to launch China's first reusable rocket into orbit, the *Hyperbola-2* by the end of this year.[23]

India's Space Goals

India's space goals comprise the development of cost-effective launch systems to include reusable rockets, manufacture satellites, develop a lunar soft-landing capacity, and utilize space for national development. These consist ofspace supported services like e-commerce, tele-medicine, satellite internet, GPS, ATM, e-banking, weather forecasting, agriculture development andto help identify Prospective Fishing Zones (PFZs).[24] By 2022, India aspires to send humans to LEO and by 2030, establish its own space station. Space is viewed as part of India's global reputation and prestige, and a significant component of its grand strategy. Unlike China, however, the Indian space program does not have a focus on developing cislunar presence, or develop the capacity to extract resources from space. Despite the former President

of India, Dr. APJ Abdul Kalam highlighting the significance of developing technologies like SBSP, the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) does not have an active SBSP program.

India's Civilian, Military and Commercial Space Capacities

India's space launch capacity is supported by the Polar Satellite Launch Vehicle (PSLV), and the Geosynchronous Satellite Launch Vehicle (GSLV). India can launch multiple payloadsto LEO(104 satellites on a single launch) in 2017,[25] and 29 satellites to three different orbits in 2019.[26] India launched its first Moon mission in 2008 with its *Chandrayaan 1* lunar orbiter mission. This mission included NASA's Moon Mineralogy Mapper (M^3) that helped confirm the presence of water ice on the lunar surface.[27]In 2014, India successfully sent a Mars orbiter, *Mangalyaan*, with a low cost of $74 million.[28]In 2019, Indiacame very close to landing on the Moon but failed in the last few seconds. India, in collaboration with Japan, is working on the third lunar mission and an independent second Mars mission.

In 2008, as a response to China's ASAT test in 2007, India established a separate Integrated Space Cell within the Integrated Defence Services Headquarters. This was followed by the Space Security Coordination Group (SSCG) under the National Security Adviser (NSA). In March 2019, India launched its *Mission Shakti* ASAT test against its own target satellite Microsat-R.[29]The ASAT test demonstrated India's capability to hit adversary objects (interdict and intercept) in space, described by Prime Minister, Narendra Modi as a deterrent asset against attacks on India's space infrastructure.[30]India also has its own NAVIC global navigation satellite system (GNSS), that has been identified as an "allied system" by the 2020 U.S. National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).[31]

India has a vibrant commercial space sector, with space start ups concentrating on developing rocket propulsion technology, manufacture satellites, develop satellite internet, demonstrate power beaming technologies and construct private rockets. Some of the

companies to watch are Bellatrix[32], R-beam, Blue Sky Analytics,[33] Dhruva Space,[34]Satsure,[35]TeamIndus,[36]*Exseed Space*[37] and Skyroot.[38]

Conclusion

Based on the assessment above, it can be inferred that both China and India are concentrating on developing their space capacity for power projection and as necessary conditions to cement their major power status. For China, space has been identified as core infrastructure to include development of space-based internet, its interconnected 5G, and the launch of its 6G test satellite last year. China also views space as a territory, that has the potential to be disputed, not dissimilar to its strategic discourses on the South China Sea (SCS) disputed islands. Chinese space thinkers stress the critical importance of first presence and naming of territories, as offering entitlements to then set the rules of space governance. A way to ensure claim and first presence is the naming of sites in Mandarin. We see this reflected in Chinese attempts to name the disputed islands in SCS and East China Sea (ECS). Spratly Islands in the SCS are called Nánshâ islands (WS™l£n›\). The ECS islands are calledDiaoyu islands (""|œ›\). The Paracel islands are called Xisha group of islands (n‰™l£n). Even the seas have different names for the countries that dispute the islands.[39] The ECS is called Dong Hāi ("Nwm) and the SCS is called Nan Hāi (WSwm) by China. A similar pattern of behavior is observable in China's naming of areas in Antarctica with Chinese names.[40]Naming a territory is critical in Chinese conception of legitimacy and consequent "first presence" right especially in their strategy of cislunar command and control. The location on the Moon's farside where Chang'e-4 landed last year has been named Statio Tianhe. This name included the lunar landing site as well as three craters and a hill. Liu Jizhong, director of the China Lunar Exploration and Space Engineering Center of CNSA, stated that the name was approved by the International Astronautical Union (IAU) thereby conferring international legitimacy, a move in diplomacy much prized by the CPC. China also named the hill that was utilized to locate the

Chang'e 4 as Mons Tai, with Tai signifying the five great mountains of China. Already, China has named the landing site of the Chang'e 3 as "Guang Han Gong" or "Moon Palace".

How Chinese strategic thinkers view such naming of territory and first presence could differ from other countries. Applying Chinese classical texts on warfare, like Sun Tzu's *Art of War*, Wei Liaozi's text on military strategy, three strategies of Huang Shi Gong and several others, supplemented by military writings of Communist Party of China (CPC) top leaders like Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Xi Jinping should prove insightful into understanding China's strategic culture.[41]

India's strategic culture is undergoing a change under Prime Minister Modi who has stressed the importance of space and the role of ISRO in India's space capacity building. From the Nehruvian strategic culture focus on international reputation and civilian space advocacy to the testing of nuclear weapons under the Atal Bihari Vajpayee led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) to a Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) led strategic culture informed by realism, nationalism and India first, space has been elevated to the realm of comprehensive national power and military power projection capabilities. Prime Minister Modi has directed the establishment of a Defense Space Agency that would be under the Indian Air Force to coordinate space military activities. Right after India's ASAT weapon test, Prime Minister Modi tweeted on March 27, 2019: "#MissionShakti is special for 2 reasons: (1) India is only the 4th country to acquire such a specialized & modern capacity. (2) Entire effort is indigenous. India stands tall as a space power! It will make India stronger, even more secure and will further peace and harmony."[42]

Space is fast becoming an integral part of grand strategic calculations and power projection capacities, not just a secondary grand strategic consideration, limited to support and logistics. The next decade or so will be eventful for space power and space power theory as countries develop capacities to establish permanent presence on the Moon and beyond. It is time we factor in space as a critical 'intervening variable' in our understanding of international politics and grand strategy. It is

the right moment to craft a theory that understands the true potential of space and what that can hold, for the future of humanity.

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Bio-Note

Dr. Namrata Goswami is an Independent Scholar on Space Policy, International Politics, a TEDx speaker, and Co-Author of *Scramble for the Skies The Great Power Competition to Control the Resources of Outer Space* published by Lexington Press, an imprint of Rowman & Littlefield in October 2020.

Public Policy: State and Economy

Dr. Saswati Choudhury

Abstract

No unanimity can be found on a precise definition of public policy. Policies are purposive courses of action devised in response to a perceived problem. In any public policy-making process, political and economic forces engage in strategic interactions for resolving diverse interests. Governance structures also determine the nature and scope of the political feedback mechanisms from groups affected by public policies. Governments of newly independent developing countries and many Western countries facing reconstruction after World War II saw a major role for the state in redefining the production process in the post war period. Behind these judgements was pessimism about the market's ability to deliver economic change in key dimensions with the speed deemed necessary. Over the course of the last decade, scholars have begun to make significant theoretical and empirical advancements in analyzing the link between governance structures, political economy, and the selection of actual policies. In fact, public policy shapes and reshapes various competing priorities in tandem with the changes in governance and interplay of economic and various political regimes

and interest groups.

Introduction

Both theory and the experience of developing countries advocate for a substantial role for the state in development process. The post-World War II which witnessed a major reconstruction and restructuring across nations, pursued a series of policies, including tariff protection, subsidies, public provisioning of services, and other types of controls aimed at developing the nations. Fundamental to the design of the developmental state for these countries was the creation of an alliance between politics and the economy, which materialized in the establishment of a specialized bureaucratic apparatus that had ample powers and coordinated the developmental efforts, at least in their initial stages (Caldenty:2008)[2]. Many of the early post-war scholars working on development proposed extensive government involvement in the process of production through both public ownership and physical controls in order to ensure optimal resource allocation and rebuilding the social fabric. This recommendation was founded largely on microeconomic theory, on a broad concept of standard of living and on historical experience rather than on theories of growth, where *a priori* one might have looked for some guidance on how policy might influence development. Whilst growth theories have provided a useful framework for analysis, however what determines the rate of growth remains unresolved till date. Hence normative questions on policy concerning growth, have not been easy to pose in that context. There have been some limited progress, but these models or frameworks are yet to come in grip with some key issues of great importance for developing countries. Government action in developing countries for welfare purposes with larger public interest remain a core responsibility and government spending and resources required thereof within the competing necessities remain a matter of primacy in public policy making.

Political scientist, James E. Anderson defines policy as a relatively

stable, purposive course of action followed by an actor or set of actors in dealing with a problem or a matter of concern (Anderson, 1997)[3]. Primarily public policy focuses on what is actually done instead of what is only proposed or intended, and it differentiates a policy from mere decision, which is essentially a choice among competing alternatives. Therefore, public policy is developed and implemented by government agency and officials, though non-state actors and factors may influence its process. In any public policy-making process, political and economic forces are at play in resolving the strategic interactions among the various interests. Important to this is the governance structure which lays down the constitutional design including voting rules, rule of law, property rights, laws of exchange, and rules and principles by which the rules itself is made. Constitutional rules of a state provides regulatory and institutional framework, various degrees of political, civil, and economic freedom and alternatives to existing legal framework. Governance structures set the boundaries for the political and economic link and the selection of actual policies. Discussion and debates on public policy making therefore largely remains within the domain of political economy analysis and seeks to explain the selection and implementation of public policies.

Negotiating public policy

Developmental state policies are not a feature limited to the twentieth century. European countries relied on state/public policies throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the United States during nineteenth century and the countries in Latin America used the same approach during the second half of the nineteenth century. Historical accounts reveal that the public policies had been a major tool for developmental state and a recurrent feature under different historical context and circumstances, in different geographical locations. While major focus of public policy was both economic and social welfare with large state intervention, the Latin America debt crisis of the 1980s, the spread of globalization, and the East Asian financial crisis in 1997,

together with the neo liberal approach of the Chicago school and the ideological positioning of the Washington Consensus among scholars and academics, have substantially influenced the focus and aim of public policy making. Today, major focus of public policy debate is preoccupied with macroeconomic stability, property rights, and contract enforcement and partial intervention in education, health, and social security and pensions. Conflicts between the public interest and private interests naturally emerge in the design and implementation of public policies. Some public policies pursue the public interest by attempting to correct for market imperfections, lower transaction costs, effectively regulate externalities, or enhance productivity. Still other public policies are the result of manipulation by powerful groups actively engaged in the pursuit of their own self-interest. Implementation of public policies therefore can lead to both intended and unintended consequences.

Modern economics has used the concepts of asymmetric information, incentive compatibility, participation constraints, and credible commitments to isolate the incentives embodied in specific policy regimes. Unintended consequences often result from hidden actions or hidden information. Hidden actions are typically characterized as moral hazard problems, while hidden information is generally divided into adverse selection or signalling problems. Once policies are designed and/or implemented, the process of incidence begins with the assessment of winners and losers. Some groups or segments of the market may bear the burden of the public policies while other groups may reap the gains. The actual incidence of any designed and implemented public policy depends on individual agent incentives and ultimately the market structure. The economic consequences are generally measured both in terms of economic growth or the size of the economic pie and its distribution among various interests. A review of literature on public policy lamented that although ideas are essential and fundamental in policy making, however there was scanty attention paid in empirical analysis. This notion began to change with rational choice theory as researchers began to explore effect

of ideas on public policy. Review studies on public policies have shown that paradigm shift occurs when policy makers find themselves faced with unusual political economic problem for which the current paradigm holds no solution. Until the last few decades, the vast majority of public policy analysis has focused on analytical dimension of economics with scanty attention to the political backdrop or the governance structure.

Public policy and interface of politics and economics

Outcomes in policy-making reflect personal exchanges and relationships. Accordingly, the relative positions and influence of agents, players or interest groups must represent the core of political economic analysis. In personal exchanges, relative positions and influence can be characterized by relative power. In this context, the argument advanced by Russell (1938[4]) is compelling: "The fundamental concept in social science is power in the same sense in which energy is the fundamental concept in physics."

The historical origins of the political economic lens can be traced back to the original architects of the economics discipline, namely Adam Smith, Mill, Wicksell, and Marshall. With the introduction of the Walrasian framework, however, mainstream economics swept aside political economic origins. This process was accelerated by the remarkable elegance and clarity of the Arrow-Debreu extensions of the basic Walrasian model. Essentially, many features of reality were discarded by mainstream economists in order to facilitate theorizing the real world situation with a set of equations.

Although many scholars might bemoan the distortions of reality emanating from the separation of economics from political science, it certainly allowed mainstream economics to proceed unfettered. The separation of economics from other disciplines resulted in the formulation of an abstraction that might not otherwise have been delineated, and it permitted the development of the most significant of social theories, classical microeconomics. The separation of politics and

other social relationships from mainstream economics and the focus on impersonal exchange meant that few conceptual frameworks existed for explaining the formation of public policies. However, the process of globalization has led to a change in the understanding the notion of state and political processes and the state is often the mediator between the rights of citizens and the interests of global forces. As the nature of the state is being transformed in response to internal public demands, vested class interests, and global capitalist forces, it tends to redefine and restructure the rights and obligations of citizens. This changing sphere reinforces the role of state and its political process and the economy in the larger interest of the citizen and global forces. Public policy in current times once again brings back the enquiry into state, its nature and functions, and the public and their rights and competing demands. In articulation of the political economic lens, one can see that power is distributed between the government and various interest groups and often ill distribution of power can blunt any and all efforts at improved efficiency. As argued by Williamson (1975)[5], all collective action organizations, government or otherwise, consist of a "center" which directs group actions and participants from periphery. The individual well-being is affected by center's choices and hence individual participants at the periphery strive to influence the center's choices. The center also consists of individuals with their own private interests; and while it is not unreasonable to expect central decision makers to fully internalize the group's goals, it would be unrealistic to ignore their personal interests. As a result, the center is exposed to attempts where its choices may be influenced by participants from the periphery who can either reward or penalize members of the center. In such a situation market do not depend on price signals. Price signals are themselves a set of function of 'identities of decision makers' and the political markets and bargaining power therein, determine the public decision making process for collective good. It would have been nice if there was a method for ascertaining the social preferences of the public in some scientific way and using the results to make decisions about social

issues. Arrow examined this matter long time ago and derived a mathematical theorem, called Arrow's Impossibility Theorem that says that in general it is impossible by any political means to derive such a social welfare function. There is a modification of Arrow's result to the effect that if there is sufficient agreement among the preferences of the public, then it is possible to derive objectively a social welfare function. Individual preferences do not have to be identical, although that of course would guarantee the existence of a social welfare function for the group. It has to be that there is enough common perception of the alternatives that can be aligned in a spectrum and all individual preferences have the property of single-peakedness; i.e., there is some most preferred alternative and the preferences drop away monotonically from that most preferred alternative.

In the public policy making, there is the 'center' that consists of policy makers who are constitutionally authorized to make policy choices. Constitutionally, a polycentric structure comprising several units (e.g., federal, state, local) is hierarchical between the center and the subordinate units from the periphery. The relationship between policy-making center and these hierarchical units defines a reciprocal power structure in which each party employs its means of power in the bargaining process. A political-economic equilibrium can be derived for this process, with a presumed cooperative outcome defined by each of the participating unit's rationality.

Indian experience

India's experience in public policy making is taken up as a case to understand how this process takes place in a hierarchical democratic structure in a multicultural and plural society like India and how does a developmental state decide its policy intervention depending on changing dynamics of time and political process?

The links between policy and developmental role of Indian state can be divided into two major phases in India's post-independence

history. These are what can be termed as Arvind Virmani[6] calls the 'Indian version of Socialism (IVS)' or simply 'Indian Socialism' and 'Experiments in Market Reform (EMR).' Each policy regime shows a change in emphasis and scope. For example in the first policy regime we can identify two sub-regimes: One a regime of Commanding Heights and second Administrative Socialism. Similarly India's experiments with 'Market' can be divided into two groups-structural reforms of initial phase and regulatory framework and governance emphasis.

The phase of Indian socialism made conscious effort to increase the role of the State in the economy (commanding heights). Structural backwardness and varied regional character of the newly independent Indian state justified the role of an interventionist state for promoting development. Political leadership of the country adopted a kind of socialist philosophy in a democratic structure which set its own limits. The State's role expanded through multiple policies like nationalisation of industries and financial institutions, reservation of sectors for the government (public sector) investment in infrastructure and other production activities, legislative measures to control and direct private activity and equity driven tax systems with high rates. Mahalanobis model of growth gave a framework for planning state's course of action with required policy. To recall the period, import control, capital goods production by the public sector and reservation of employment intensive industries for traditional (handloom) and small-scale sectors were some of its characteristics. An inherent assumption was that market failure was a serious issue in allocation of resources to desired goal for overall development of a nation and hence the private sector could not be trusted. The public sector (essentially bureaucratic) controlled investment could produce economic and socially superior outcomes. The vital role of competition remained conspicuous by its absence and market distortions were believed could be corrected through appropriate public policy measures through bureaucratic control of what we all later came to know as regime of license raj. The socialist pattern of growth idealized a planned development approach within a multi party

democratic structure, to reach commanding heights by ensuring balanced development. The interest of the constituent states were mediated with various policies with respect to their specific needs (e.g. special category status to states of north east which were economically weak, socially different form rest of India but were placed strategically in so far as India's external and internal security was concerned).

The social justice model that influenced public policy making in India underwent changes since the mid eighties and structural adjustment of the economy and political setup in the 90s. The pursuit of a market economy led to structural shifts in terms of emphasis laid and policies designed. The liberalization of the economy also called for changes in the share of power among the constituent units of government. The Indian Government in its endeavour to strengthen local governments passed the seventy-fourth amendment Act in the year 1992. The Act provides for initiating reforms in the constitution, composition and functioning of rural and urban local governments and empowered State governments to amend their Acts accordingly. From direct administrative control through bureaucracy there was a move towards regulation regime with policy designs in respect of political and economic resource sharing. The process of global economic engagement called for opening of national economies with set of regulatory mechanism and lesser state interference. The market which had been once seen as the major ill for development policies was the new prescription to remove distortions brought in by bureaucratic control and restrictive public policies. While social justice and equity justified India's five year socialist plan era, market competitiveness was the new paradigm to remove the distortions created by planning era. Efficiency versus equity dominated public policy debates.

In India public policy is dependent on three factors: federal democracy, demography and the economy of each of the states (Panandiker 1998)[7]. The most important political development in India over the course of last seven decades has been the gradual transfer of political power from the western educated urban middle class to a

growing section of the regionally educated rural class. The priorities of this new political class are distinctively different as much as their perception of complex economic and strategic issues (Panandiker 1998). The ethnic diversity together with the caste factor therefore plays an important role in public policy making. Coming to the question of federal democracy, the Indian democratic structure is a complex system both in institutional terms and process terms (Panandiker 1998). The complex system of democratic decentralization is ensured through a process of participatory democracy comprising of three million elected Panchayat members, 4120 members of the State legislative assemblies and 788 members of both the houses of parliament elected by more than 70 core voters. Given the fact that 69 percent of the Indian population is settled in rural India, the presence of political consciousness among the masses will obviously decide their choice of representatives who can best articulate their aspirations. The Mandalisation of the Indian polity and the emergence of political leaders from the backward classes and their participation in governance have been shaping the priority issues for the government and policy decisions. Further, the emergence of the backward classes with strong regional roots based on local issues also has made the Indian political process a coalition game where the 'powerful' hold the shots.

While electoral democracy has been the demarcating factor in the devolution and share of power from Centre to the local bodies, demography also has been an equally strong force. The size of population and religious and ethnic groupings have their significant impact in public policy debates and issues. This is evident from the fact that eleven most populous states of the country which account for 74 percent of the country's total population have a dominating influence on the political economy. The three states of UP, Bihar and Maharashtra account for more than 33 percent of the country's total population and states of UP and Bihar with large incidence of rural poor emphasize on a pro-poor policy orientation, while Maharashtra as a industrializing state is more prone to a market friendly liberal policy framework.

Another major determinant of the development policies in India happens to be the economic structure of the constituent states. The poorer states which are basically dependent on agriculture demand pro agricultural policies. Incidentally, the states of Bihar, UP, Madhya Pradesh figure significantly here. On the contrary, states like Gujarat and Maharashtra which are industrial states, demand for more liberalized market friendly policies. States like Punjab, Haryana, Kerala which have lower incidence of poverty have different policy needs. As Varshney (1999)[8] writes, the more direct the impact of a public policy and greater the number of people affected by it, and more organized the section, higher is the chance that such issues enters the domain of mass policy preferences through public debates and articulation. Ethnic issues, local problems based on caste lines, public distribution system of supplying subsidized rice, wheat etc. free medical care, cash transfer to poor are major concerns of mass politics in India. Not all aspects of public policy happen to concern all and this is more so in case of reforms on trade and investment which distinctly concern urban and metro based big industrialists. The industrialists and business houses concentrated in a few states are also major patrons of election funding and, hence, decisions on trade liberalizations which have economic merits get safe passages as they pave the way for revenue generations in two ways- first for the country through its income from trade and secondly the patronage for political parties. Therefore, while on the one hand trade liberalization is vigorously pursued, on the other hand rural votes are ensured by pushing through pro-poor development policies. Economic development has been re-cast into jargons of 'social and redistributive justice' to the poor in a market friendly liberalized economy. It is not without reason why one finds that policies for rural development starting with the Integrated Rural Development Programme and the infamous Agricultural and Rural Debt Relief Scheme have been re-emphasized time and again. It is also not without reason that in each of the Five Year Plans, the size of allocations of the annual budgets for rural development schemes was kept at higher

proportion and the same continues even as we talk of a market economy today.

The rise in income disparity in India in the post liberalization period and, hence, keeping in view the objective of 'social justice' of the pro-rural political class, the new policies on pro-poor schemes and allocations increased. The fractured electoral verdict over the years between the centre and the state and growing regionalization of the political parties seem to have further reinforced the phenomenon. The regional parties are an off shoot of the 'felt deprivation' and 'perceived neglect' of 'Centre' over the years and hence an attempt at capture of a power share at the 'Centre' through coalition with major national political parties help keep alive the pro-rural and ethnic issues whose sum and substance are almost the same across all regional political parties. Therefore, electoral representation, regional 'development politics' and politics of resources are three important factors in India's public policy debates. Instances like announcement of loan waiver for farmers, adoption of a National Rural Employment Guarantee Programme, Universal health cover or Ayushman Bharat, increasing farmers income, rural electrification or Uhjjwala Yojana, financial inclusion or Jan dhan Yojana for the poor while at the same time easing of interest and taxes for corporate sectors indicate the complexity of concerns for public policy in India.

Conclusion

There are several features of political-economic dynamics in public policy with development agenda. A systematic feedback loop in democratic structure through mass resistance and opposition in public domain or through opposition in legislative process, the political-economic systems tend to gravitate toward particular equilibria sustained by politically powerful status quo forces. To the extent that such equilibria are manifestly inefficient, reforms occur largely as a result of political crises involving major shifts in the underlying power structure. The national political arena is equally influenced by the economising and depoliticising tendencies that restrict policy-making and thereby

political processes. If we take the case of local politics, it is exemplary that the dominant development agenda is strongly pro-decentralisation (for limiting central state power and furthering participation) yet opposing calls for self-determination, particularly those running against the rules and interests of the national economic agenda. Another issue has to do with the tensions between democracy, on the one hand, and large inequalities and a major concentration of power, on the other hand. In theory, democratic decentralization is for freedom and against the concentration of power in just a few hands, whether political (strong state) or economic (monopolies, cartels). In practice, however, due to policies for open markets, market players have gained freedom at the cost of citizens' political influence, while economic inequalities have expanded nationally and also internationally. The threefold development agenda on economics, governance and politics has indeed been far from unbiasedness or 'interest-free', since governance and democratisation have been moulded into concepts and policies that are supportive of vested global economic interests. The strategy to further the democratization process as Robinson (2000:43)[9] claims is intended 'to make the world both available and safe for global production system by creating the best conditions around the world for the unfettered operation of the new corporate governance that largely influence the current public policy across nations.

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Indo-U.S Relationship During Modi Government (2014-2019)

Dr. Archana Sarma

Overview-

The bilateral relationship between India and the United States has evolved into a "global strategic partnership" built on shared democratic values and growing convergence of interests on bilateral, regional, and global concerns. The government of India's emphasis on development and good governance has created an opportunity to revive bilateral ties and expand cooperation under the mottos "Chalein Saath Saath: Forward Together We Go" and "SanjhaPrayas, Sab ka Vikas" (Shared Effort, Progress for All), which were adopted during Prime Minister Modi and President Obama's first two summits in September 2014 and January 2015. The India-US re-engagement was dubbed the "India-US re-engagement" in a joint statement published in June 2016.

Regular high-level political visits have given bilateral collaboration a boost, while broad and ever-expanding dialogue architecture has set a long-term framework for India-US cooperation. India-US bilateral cooperation is now comprehensive and multi-sectoral, encompassing commerce and investment, military and security,

education, science and technology, cyber security, high-technology, civil nuclear energy, space technology and applications, clean energy, agriculture, and health. Our bilateral relationship is nourished by vibrant people-to-people connection and support from both sides of the political spectrum.

When Narendra Modi was elected Prime Minister of India, few expected him to be such a staunch supporter of deeper US–India cooperation. The prospects were not good when he took office. The arrest of Devyani Khobragade (2013), India's deputy consul-general in New York, had crippled bilateral ties less than six months prior, displaying many underlying Indian animosities toward the US. Unfortunately for both countries, many Washington groups had their own grievances by that time. The Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act, passed in 2010, had cast a cloud over the upbeat environment that had surrounded the historic nuclear pact. The Indian Air Force's selection of the French Rafale over an American fighter in a multi-role combat aircraft competition seemed to add salt to the wound. Overall, the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government in New Delhi's second term was a huge failure in terms of the expanding US–India relationship. Manmohan Singh, the then-Prime Minister of India, was increasingly marginalised within his own party and government, and thus unable to meet any US expectations, whether they related to expanding bilateral cooperation under the 2005 US–India defence partnership agreement or multilateral negotiations such as the Doha trade talks, which were approaching a critical juncture.

For supporters of US–India relations in both countries, it was a trying time. Since the substantial improvement in bilateral ties during Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee's tenure, Americans and Indians who recognise the benefits of closer connections have hoped that they would continue to strengthen in order to allow the creation of a true strategic partnership. When Vajpayee boldly pushed the US and India to think of themselves as "natural allies," he foresaw this possibility. To many people's surprise, his successor, Manmohan Singh, defied the

suffocating grip of non-alignment that had dominated the Congress party's foreign policy vision to honour Vajpayee's legacy by negotiating the one outcome that the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) had failed to achieve during its time in power from 1998 to 2004. Responding to Bush's fondness for India, Singh signed a nuclear pact with the US that fulfilled Vajpayee's aim of maintaining nuclear weapons while benefiting from international nuclear cooperation in the civilian realm. This 'accord,' which reversed decades of US global nonproliferation policy by granting India a one-time exemption, was widely regarded as the height of the shift in bilateral relations. And the huge political sacrifices made by both sides on this issue only added fuel to the fire that much larger things were on the way.

These hopes, however, were dashed during Dr. Singh's second term. Modi's historic landslide victory in 2014 earned his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) its first outright majority in the Lok Sabha and the first absolute electoral majority in any Indian national election since 1984, despite the depressing climate. Narendra Modi's rise to the top of Indian politics was notable for several reasons: he was the first Indian prime minister elected from a generation born after Independence; his election to high office despite humble beginnings demonstrated the political mobility of a truly democratic system; and his elevation to national power from his previous post as chief minister demonstrated the political mobility of a genuinely democratic system.

When President Barack Obama eventually called Modi to congratulate him, he showed a graciousness that not only belied the worries of the past, but also effectively reset US–India relations for the future. Understanding how this happened necessitates knowledge of both the core difficulty in the two countries' relationship as well as Modi's singular contribution to its management.

PM Modi and His Way if Managing the Uneven Indo-Us Relationships

I'd want to look at the current trend in the Indo-US relationship via the lens of several key categories-

Political :

In recent years, the number of high-level visits and exchanges between India and the United States has increased dramatically. Prime Minister Modi visited the United States from September 26 to September 30, 2014, and met with President Barack Obama, members of the United States Congress, and political leaders from across the country, including from various states and cities, as well as members of President Barack Obama's Cabinet. He also went out to business and industrial leaders in the United States, as well as civil society organisations and think tanks in the United States and the Indian-American community. The visit resulted in the release of a Vision Statement and a Joint Statement.

The visit was followed by President Obama's travel to India as the Chief Guest at India's Republic Day celebrations on January 25-27, 2015. The two sides signed a Delhi Declaration of Friendship and adopted a Joint Strategic Vision for Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean Region during their visit. Both sides upgraded their Foreign Ministers' Strategic Dialogue to a Strategic and Commercial Dialogue of Foreign and Commerce Ministers.

Prime Minister Modi traveled to the United States on September 23-28, 2015, for a bilateral meeting with President Barack Obama, as well as interactions with industry, media, academics, provincial leaders, and the Indian community, especially in Silicon Valley. On March 31 and April 1, 2016, Prime Minister Narendra Modi travelled to the United States for President Barack Obama's multinational Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC. On the 6th and 8th of June, Prime Minister Narendra Modi paid an official working visit to the United States, during which he conducted bilateral conversations with President Barack Obama and spoke before a Joint Session of the United States Congress. Prime Minister Modi was the sixth Indian Prime Minister to speak to Congress in the United States.

The two countries' leaders have frequent contact, including phone calls and meetings on the sidelines of international conferences. Since

President Trump's election in November 2016, the two have spoken on the phone three times. The Prime Minister's Office and the White House have created a hotline.

India-U.S. Dialogue :

Between the two governments, there are around 50 bilateral dialogue mechanisms. The Strategic and Commercial Dialogue at the level of EAM and MoS(Commerce and Industry) had its first two meetings in September 2015 and August 2016 in Washington, DC and New Delhi, respectively. Strategic Cooperation, Energy and Climate Change, Education and Development, Economy, Trade and Agriculture, Science and Technology, and Health and Innovation are the five traditional pillars of bilateral ties on which the former Strategic Dialogue of Foreign Ministers focused. On August 30, 2016, New Delhi hosted the second meeting of the Strategic and Commercial Dialogue. There are also Ministerial-level dialogues on home security (Homeland Security Dialogue), finance (Financial and Economic Partnership), trade (Trade Policy Forum), HRD (Higher Education Dialogue), science and technology (Joint Commission Meeting on S&T), and energy (Joint Commission Meeting on Energy) (Energy Dialogue).

Major interactions in 2015, 2016 and 2017:

The managing of tension in their mutual strategic calculations has always been a fundamental challenge in post-Cold War US–India ties. Washington and New Delhi see each other as partners with common — but not necessarily similar — goals. The United States wants to maintain its current dominance in the international system. It can't do anything else because it's the world's hegemony. India, on the other hand, aims to enhance its relative power in order to meet its own domestic development goals as well as increase its security and influence abroad.

In 2015, there were several high-level delegations in both directions.

Secretary of State John Kerry led the United States team to the Vibrant Gujarat Summit in Ahmedabad in January. The US Secretary of the Treasury, Jacob Lew, visited India in February for the fifth meeting of the Economic and Financial Partnership Initiative, which he shared with our Finance Minister. In April, US Secretary of Transportation Anthony Foxx travelled to India to meet with Indian equivalent ministers. In June, Defense Secretary Ashton Carter undertook a bilateral visit to India. In April, India's Finance Minister and Minister of State (IC) for Environment, Forests, and Climate Change visited Washington, D.C., the former for the IMF/World Bank Spring Meeting and the latter for the Major Economies Forum meeting. In June, the Finance Minister returned to the United States to promote Indian investment. In October, the United States Trade Representative will visit Washington, DC. In December 2015, Raksha Mantri travelled to the United States on the request of his American counterpart. In August, Haryana's Chief Minister led a state delegation. Parliamentarians and senior officials from both countries have made several visits.

Railway Minister Shri Suresh Prabhu visited in January, Finance Minister Shri Arun Jaitley visited in April 2016, Minister for Urban Development Shri Venkaiah Naidu, Minister of Road Transport, Highways and Shipping Shri Nitin Gadkari visited in July, Raksha Mantri Shri Manohar Parrikar visited in August, and Minister of State (IC) for Petroleum and Natural Gas Shri Dharmendra Pradhan visited in September. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter in April and December, Secretary of State John Kerry and Secretary of Commerce Penny Pritzker in August, and United States Trade Representative Mike Froman in October (from the U.S. to India). Shri Shivraj Singh Chouhan, Chief Minister of Madhya Pradesh (August), Shri Raghubar Das, Chief Minister of Jharkhand (September), Shri Chandra Sekhar Rao, Chief Minister of Telangana (September), and Shri Raman Singh, Honorable Chief Minister of Chhattisgarh (November/ December) also visited the United States to promote investment in their respective states.

The high-level interactions resumed in 2017. In March, Shri Dharmendra Pradhan, Minister of State (I/C) for Petroleum and Natural Gas, visited Houston and Washington, DC, where he met with US Energy Secretary Rick Perry. Shri Arun Jaitley, the Finance Minister of India, visited the United States in April for an IMF-World Bank meeting and met with his American counterpart. In March, the National Security Adviser and Foreign Secretary paid a visit to the United States and spoke with a diverse group of senior American leaders. NSA H.R. McMaster travelled to India in April on behalf of the United States.

Consultations on Policy:

On bilateral, regional, and global concerns, regular contacts have taken place at the political and official levels. Consultations between India's Foreign Secretary and the United States' Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs are an important aspect of the dialogue system. The last session of Foreign Office Consultations took place in April 2015 in New Delhi. In September 2015, a new High-Level Consultation between India's Foreign Secretary and the United States' Deputy Secretary of State was formed, and it has met twice since then, in December 2015 in New Delhi and July 2016 in Washington, D.C. In September 2015, the two sides also began a Policy Planning Dialogue.

The most recent session of Foreign Office Consultations took place in April 2015 in New Delhi. In September 2015, a new High-Level Consultation between India's Foreign Secretary and the US Deputy Secretary of State was formed, and it has met twice since then, in December 2015 in New Delhi and July 2016 in Washington, D.C. In September 2015, the two sides began a Policy Planning Dialogue.

Nuclear Cooperation:

In July 2007, the bilateral civil nuclear cooperation agreement was negotiated, and in October 2008, it was signed. During Prime Minister Modi's September 2014 visit to the United States, the two countries established a Contact Group to expedite the complete and

timely implementation of the India-US Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, as well as to settle outstanding issues.

Defence Collaboration:

India-U.S. Defence Framework Agreement was updated and renewed for another 10 years in June 2015. The agreement covers defence trade, exercises, personnel exchanges, collaboration and cooperation in maritime security and counter-piracy, and exchanges between each of the three services.

India participated in Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise in July-August 2016 for the second time with an Indian Naval Frigate. The two countries conduct more bilateral exercises with each other than they do with any other country. Bilateral dialogue mechanisms in the field of defence include Defence Joint Working Group (DJWG), Defence Procurement and Production Group (DPPG) and Senior Technology Security Group (STSG).

India and the US have launched a Defence Technology and Trade Initiative (DTTI) aimed at exploring possibilities of co-development and co-production. Aggregate worth of defence acquisition from U.S. has crossed over US$ 13 billion. DTTI meeting in Delhi in July 2016 decided to broaden its agenda by setting up five new Joint Working Groups on: Naval Systems, Air Systems, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance, Chemical and Biological Protection; and Other Systems.

During Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to the United States in June 2016, the United States designated India as a "Major Defense Partner," committing the US to facilitate technology sharing with India on par with its closest allies and partners, as well as industry collaboration for defence co-production and co-development.

Trade and Commerce:

India-US bilateral trade in goods and services increased from $104 billion in 2014 to $114 billion in 2016. Bilateral merchandise trade is

showing an encouraging growth trajectory in 2017. Both countries have made a commitment to facilitate actions necessary for increasing the bilateral trade to $500 billion. During the first three months of 2017, bilateral merchandise trade stood at $17.2 billion as compared to $16.2billion during the same period of 2016. India and the US have set up a bilateral Investment Initiative in 2014, with a special focus on facilitating FDI, portfolio investment, capital market development and financing of infrastructure.

The two leaders during Prime Minister Modi's visit to the United States in June 2016 welcomed the engagement of U.S. private sector companies in India's smart city programme. USAID will serve as knowledge partner for the Urban India Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) alliance to facilitate access to clean water, hygiene and sanitation in 500 Indian cities.

Counter-Terrorism and Internal Security:

India-U.S. Joint Working Group on Counter-Terrorism held its 14th meeting in July 2016 in Washington DC. An arrangement was concluded in June 2016 to facilitate exchange of terrorist screening information through the designated contact points. The two sides have agreed on a joint work plan to counter the threat of Improvised Explosives Device (IED).

Energy and Climate Change:

The US-India Energy Dialogue was established in May 2005 to encourage energy trade and investment, and its most recent conference took place in September 2015 in Washington, DC. The Energy Dialogue is divided into six working groups: oil and gas, coal, power and energy efficiency, new technologies& renewable energy, civil nuclear cooperation, and sustainable development.

India and the U.S. are advancing cooperation and dialogue on climate change through a high-level Climate Change Working Group and a Joint Working Group on Hydroflurocarbon. An MoU was

concluded in 2014 to provide US$ 1 billion in financing for India's transition to a low-carbon economy. In June 2016, the two sides announced finalization of a package to provide concessional finance to support clean energy projects on track.

Space:

India and the United States have a bilateral Joint Working Group on Civil Space Cooperation. The JWG provides a forum for discussion on joint activities in space, including exchange of scientists. NASA and ISRO are collaborating for India's Mars Orbiter Mission and for a dual-band Synthetic Aperture Radar (NISAR).

Science & Technology:

Under the context of the U.S.-India Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement, which was signed in October 2005, India-US S&T cooperation has been gradually developing. The goal of the agreement was to enable mutually beneficial bilateral cooperation in science, engineering, and health care. India's $250 million contribution to the Hawaii Thirty-Meter Telescope Project and the Indian Initiative in Gravitational Observations with LIGO are examples of joint effort to build world-class research facilities.

Health Sector:

India and the United States have a long history of collaboration in biological and behavioural health sciences, HIV/AIDS, infectious diseases, cardiovascular disorders, hearing impairments, mental health, and low-cost medical technologies. In 2010, the India Centre for Global Disease Detection was founded, and in October 2012, the Epidemic Intelligence Service programme was inaugurated. Both sides agreed in September 2015 to work together institutionally in the new areas of mental health and traditional medicine regulation and capacity-building.

Education:

The Road Map for Promoting Strategic Institutional Partnerships, Deepening Collaboration in Research and Development, Fostering Partnerships in Vocational Education, and Focusing on Junior Faculty Development was given forth at the India-US Higher Education Dialogue. Up to 1000 American academics would be invited and sponsored each year to teach in Indian colleges at their leisure under India's Global Initiative of Academic Networks (GIAN). In addition, the two countries are working together to create a new Indian Institute of Technology in Ahmedabad.

People to people connections:

The Indian American community in the United States is a significant ethnic group, accounting for roughly 1% of the country's overall population. The Indian Diaspora has adapted into their chosen country, with two Indian Americans holding high-ranking positions in government and several people's representatives. In June 2016, an MOU was reached to make it easier for India to join the Global Entry Program, which allows eligible Indian citizens to enter the United States more quickly.

Cultural relation:

India and the United States have a vibrant cultural exchange that takes many forms. Many private institutes offer Indian cultural arts in addition to the India-focused educational programmes at universities and educational institutions. The Embassy provides updated information on various aspects of India that are relevant to the U.S. through its various publications.

During Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to the United States in June 2016, the two countries announced their intention to commemorate 2017 as the Year of Travel and Tourism Partnership.

Media:

With reporters stationed in Washington, D.C., and other major

cities, PTI, IANS, Times of India, The Hindu, The Hindustan Times, Outlook, Pioneer, and other Indian media organisations are well-represented in the United States. NDTV, Times Now, CNN-IBN, and Asia TV are among the TV channels available in the United States. Correspondents from websites like Rediff.com and Firstpost.com stationed here also cover India-US ties, demonstrating the growing importance of Internet-based information transmission.

To fully realise India's new beginning, it will require continued American assistance in both reviving its economy and growing its influence abroad. Modi set out to rebuild the US–India relationship in three ways that would impact both the style and substance of Indian foreign policy, based wholly on his conviction that he must do whatever it takes to advance India's interests.

First, he began by investing substantially in developing personal relationships with colleagues abroad, in contrast to his recent predecessors. He sought to cement personal friendships with national leaders who were politically important to India, whether through dramatic hugs, invitations for Presidents Obama and Trump to visit India as honoured guests on major national events, or repeated breaches of protocol by personally receiving visiting dignitaries at Indian airports.

Second, India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi has emphasised democracy's unity as a leitmotif of India's new engagement with the world without apologies or humiliation. Modi's private remarks to international peers, particularly US political elites, indicate that he genuinely considers democratic regimes as a source of international political stability. He has aligned India more openly with other democratic countries and pushed his colleagues to pursue efforts aimed at delivering security and prosperity to other regions of the globe.

Third, Modi has gradually but persistently moved India away from non-alignment rhetoric and toward strategic partnership reality. This is not to say that India is willing to be a wingman for the United States or any other big power. Instead, India has pursued its own foreign policy strategy, guided by its own objectives.

While these modifications in Modi's foreign policy approach may appear to be cosmetic, they have resulted in significant substantive gains. Two instances from vastly different fields demonstrate the concept. There is little doubt that the United States and India played crucial roles in the debates leading up to the Paris Climate Agreement, and that India defied many in its own country to make specific pledges.

Modi's willingness to acknowledge India's global obligations in tackling climate change was also crucial to success in the run-up to Paris - a concession that would have been unimaginable under India's tradition of "Third World" posturing. The fact that President Trump's tactics have jeopardised the Paris climate agreement in no way invalidates the conclusion that Modi's approach to US–India relations resulted in significant victories for India at a time when New Delhi could easily have been the target of unrelenting international pressure.

Second, Prime Minister Modi's active engagement in the creation of the 'US–India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific' was couched in friendly language, but it was significant. India expressed its intention to participate in larger diplomatic and regional integration efforts, in addition to reaffirming its commitment to freedom of navigation and overflight.

Thinking Ahead: Forwarding the Strategic Partnership

India and the United States have the most intense bilateral relationship of any country with which New Delhi deals.

The US-India strategic partnership has evolved over the last two decades. The US seeks the closest possible relationship with India, while remaining respectful of India's constraints. New Delhi seeks a deeper affiliation with Washington that bolsters its national power. Maintaining this depth is the key task for both countries in the years ahead.

If the promise of a deeper strategic cooperation is to be meaningfully realised, there may be no choice to tighter monitoring by the Prime Minister and his national security staff.

India's recent procurement of key military weapons from the

United States may not bear fruit operationally if the country refuses to secure all of the supplementary capabilities that would increase their efficacy. Reluctance to broaden the type and extent of present military exercises to include other Asian allies will keep India from reaping the full benefits of its expanding relationship with the United States.

Finally, the significance of trade liberalisation extends far beyond Trump's fixation with reducing the US's present trade imbalance with several of its trading partners. Increased two-way commerce helps both countries prosper by creating long-term stakes in each other's success. Such structural affinity protects the strategic alliance from the whims of political winds, while also bolstering the underlying geopolitical imperatives that drew it in the first place.

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India and Nepal: Problems and Prospects

Vaishali Gowala

As close neighbors, India and Nepal share a very unique bond of friendship and cooperation characterized by an open border and deep-rooted people-to-people contacts of kingship and culture. There has been a long tradition of free movement of people across border. Nepal shares border of over 1850km with 5 Indian states- Sikkim, West Bengal, Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Uttrakhand.

"The Indian- Nepal treaty of Peace and Friendship of 1950" forms the bedrock of the special relation that exists between India and Nepal.

The old ties between India and Nepal are in a state of disrepair. The issues over trade and border are rising day by day. The first and foremost issue between India and Nepal emerging is **TRADE** and **BORDER DISPUTE** Thousands of people from both the countries cross the open border everyday to work buy – sell goods and transact businesses. India remains Nepal's dominant trade partner, steadily accounting for approximately 60-65% of all trade with Nepal even as other countries, such as China have made significant inroads in the last few years. SMEs (Small Medium Enterprises) are being left behind India-Nepal trading agreements still carry vestiges of old rules. For

example:- Traders from Nepal cannot import products from India that are not manufactured in the global scenario like the Multi-National companies are setting up in India and generally assign responsibility of the whole South Asian region to their Indian offices. Despite open borders, complex regulatory requirements have complicated import and export between the two countries. This is disproportionately felt on small business. From the import export codes and invoice sanctity, the practical complexity of trade often leaves it open to high level of the voluntary authority of local customs officials a sure way to frustrate those seeking to do business. Due to these rules the large ones are easily doing the business letting the small ones hurt.

Now moving forward to the second most heated issues among India and Nepal is of the disputes arising upon the border of both the countries.

The routinely border disputes between India and Nepal has soured the bilateral relation among them. Recently, Nepal has released a new political map that claims 'Kalapani', 'Lipulekh' of Uttrakhand as part of 'Susta' (district in West Champaran of Bihar) can also be seen in the new map. The region of Kalapani serves as observation post. The 'Kali River' in the Kalapani region demarcates the border between India and Nepal. The discrepancy in locating the sources of the Kali River led to the boundary dispute between India and Nepal with each country producing maps supporting their own claims.

According to 'Nepal' the Kali River originates from a stream at Lipiyadhura. Thus, Kalapani, Limpiyadhura and Lipulekh fall to the east of the part of Nepal. It also said that the Kalapani region was offered to India by the king Mahendra after 1962 to get India's support in security as well as other issues too. As that time Tibet was annexed by China. "India's" stand in this matter is that Kali River originate in springs well- below the Lipulekh pass and the 'Sagauli Treaty' of '1815' does not demarcate the area North of these stream also, the administrative and revenue record of 19th century show the Kalapani was in Indian side. India also rejected the new map of Nepal which involves artificial

enlargement of territories, which is not based on historical facts and evidences.

Given the importance of ties with Nepal, often romanticized as one of 'Roti – beti', India must not delay dealing with the matter when India just had faceoff with China in Gallwan valley of Ladakh. Therefore stable and friendly relation with Nepal is one prerequisite which India can't afford to overlook. Both the countries should return to dialogue to discuss and resole such issues. India and Nepal must need to do more merely to resolve such heated issues to strengthen the unique social, cultural, strategic, political and economic bonds.

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Two-Front Challenge to India's National Security

Khushi K. Debabrat

National Security is the ability of the state to safeguard its constituents from various kinds of threats and ensure its survival. Its definition has evolved from an original conception of traditional military security to now encompass security issues arising out of non-military sources, such as resource scarcity, food shortage, climate change, transnational crime, etc. For instance, in 1943, Walter Lippmann said, "A nation has security when it does not have to sacrifice its legitimate interests to avoid war, and is able, if challenged, to maintain them by war." Recent definitions have included various other areas of security, especially human security.

As a growing regional power, India faces numerous challenges to its national security owing to its history, geostrategic location and unique set of internal circumstances. Externally, there is the long and porous coastline, a genesis of religious fundamentalism in previously untouched regions of South Asia, potential climate change leading to a looming migrant crisis from its coastal neighbor. However, the two primary threats to India's national security emanate from its western neighbor, Pakistan and that in the east, China. It is on the general violent threats from its two neighbours that my article will focus.

India's conflict with Pakistan has persisted from the time of Partition in 1947, snowballing from government-level skirmishes over territorial disputes to activities of non-state actors. The newly-divided states went to war with each other soon after independence in October, 1947 over Kashmir. A ceasefire could be arranged only in January, 1949 and the Line of Control was established. Even then, Pakistan went home with a third of Kashmir. After that, there have been three major wars involving conventional warfare- in 1965, when Pakistani soldiers crossed the LoC in an attempt to start an insurgency in Kashmir; in 1971, a civil war erupted between West and East Pakistan with the east seeking independence from the west. Pakistan quickly surrendered when India intervened militarily, which helped East Pakistan earn independence as Bangladesh; in 1999, Pakistani troops disguised as Kashmiri militants infiltrated into positions along the Indian side of the LoC. Today, a major bone of contention between the two continues to be Kashmir. Clashes are a frequent occurrence along the LoC and there are routine accounts of ceasefire violations by the Pakistani side. It is now well-established that Pakistan uses cross-border terrorism as an instrument of state policy. Fundamentalist Islamist groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba have conducted terrorist attacks on Indian soil with the explicit goal of integrating Kashmir into Pakistan. Unfortunately, successive governments in Pakistan have been on the same page as these groups (if not implicit about the methods to be used) when it comes to Kashmir. To compound a volatile situation, India and Pakistan both conducted nuclear tests in 1998. While India adopted a No First Use (NFU) policy in the same year, Pakistan gave no such assurances. Even then, as has been seen with all nuclear-armed rivals, bubbling tension between India and Pakistan fizzled out, as caution at the fear of a nuclear war took over. Here, it is relevant to quote Rajesh M. Basrur- "With a new confidence gained from the knowledge that India no longer had recourse to war, Pakistan stepped up its support for terrorist groups active in India, especially in Kashmir." A string of terrorist attacks on India have been perpetrated by Pakistani non-state actors in the 21st century. Among recent incidents, in 2016, armed militants attacked an

Indian army camp in Kashmir's Uri, resulting in the death of 18 soldiers. A Pakistan-based terrorist group is said to have played a prominent role in its planning and execution. Early in 2019, a suicide bomber targeted a convoy of Indian security personnel in Pulwama district of erstwhile Jammu and Kashmir, killing 40 CRPF personnel. The attack was claimed by Pakistan-based terrorist group Jaish-e-Mohammed. Pakistan, worryingly, has been continuously greylisted by the global money laundering and terror financing watchdog Financial Action Task Force for failing to check terror financing and prosecuting United Nations Security Council (UNSC)-designated terror groups based there. The ebb and flow of tensions continue with rare periods of thaw broken by violence, especially by non-state actors across the border.

India, helmed by Jawaharlal Nehru, was the second non-communist state to recognize the Mao Zedong-led communist government of China when it took power in 1949. However, from 1962, the relations between the two neighbours have only gone downhill. In 1962, Beijing initiated war against a stunned and unprepared India over the issues of Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh. China claims Arunachal Pradesh to be part of its Tibet and doesn't acknowledge India's Ladakh borders, and has indulged in a number of provocative actions to assert the same. China being India's largest trading partner notwithstanding, a strong military presence lines both sides of the Line of Actual Control (LAC), a vague demarcation by all accounts. Minor tensions along the border can quickly escalate to violent conflict. This was seen recently when 20 Indian and an undisclosed number of Chinese soldiers lost their lives following a border stand-off at Ladakh's Galwan Valley in 2020. An Indian Army statement suggested that this was a result of "an attempt by the Chinese side to unilaterally change the status quo." This is despite a bilateral agreement prohibiting the use of firearms by the soldiers of both sides along the LAC. In this conflict, physical force was used. Beijing, bolstered by a superior military capability on all fronts wouldn't hesitate to pursue an offensive approach when other conditions permit. In such a case, Chinese occupation of territory India considers its own

cannot be ruled out in some years. Territorial counter-claims, an undefined boundary, water dispute and competition for power and regional influence are sources of differences between the two nuclear-armed neighbours. Compounding India's challenges is the ever-growing friendship between Pakistan and China. They both stake claims to different parts of the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir. Their military cooperation, apart from that of economic and diplomatic, has intensified in recent times, and a two-front military threat to India is real. Veto-wielding China has already made India's job of curbing Pakistan-based terror groups difficult at the UNSC, for instance.

India has long left behind Nehruvian utopianism when it comes to China, and even more, Pakistan. A significant shift in its approach was seen when the Uri and Pulwama attacks were met with retaliation. Provocative incidents from time to time have offset strides toward rapprochement. The nature of their threats makes a focus on non-traditional security unfeasible. Consequently, India has focused on strengthening its military capabilities. Its defence budget at present stands at Rs. 4,78,000 crore, an increase from Rs. 1,45,000 crore in 2011-12. In tandem with that, India has upgraded defence ties with a number of important countries, affording it access to sensitive information, advanced military sales, geospatial cooperation, etc. Strides have been made towards a much-needed modernization of its major weapon systems. Yet, its present capacity falls short when it comes to standing up to the giant that is China, coupled with Pakistan. India also lacks a formal national security strategy. By comprehensively improving its military capabilities in pace with modern standards, India can hope to build an effective military deterrence against its regional threats. In the event of aggression, foresight, military-political cooperation, its ability to effectively coordinate its defence forces and resources in real time will determine the outcome of conflict. To conclude, India has a long way to go in handling its threats effectively. An all-encompassing formal strategy is imperative if it wants to be assertive in the face of serious threats from its opposite neighbours.

List of contributors:

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Vaishali Gowala- 5th Sem Student

Annual Lectures-
Ist Annual Lecture in 2019 on "Indian Democracy: Its strength and weaknesses"

By- Hiren Ch Nath. IPS. ADGP (SB)

2nd Annual Lecture in 2020 on "China and India's Grand Strategy in Space"

By- Dr Namrata Goswami.

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Handique Girls' College, Guwahati was established in 1939 as the Gauhati Girls' College. Mrs Rajabala Das was the founder Principal of the college. The College was initially located in the Panbazar area of the city. With the shifting to the present site in 1940, the College was renamed as Handique Girls' College (in honour of noted Philathropist R.K Handique), and became affiliated to the University of Calcutta. The college later become affiliated to the University of Gauhati following its establishment in 1948.

The Department of Political Science, Handique Girls' College, was established on the 17th of July, 1939. The Department was started as Civics with the inception of the college and was started as an independent department in 1961. It is one of the leading Departments of the College with more than 450 students in the under graduate course (Major +General).

The founder teacher of the department was Prof. Ajit Kr Sarma. Prof. Sarma headed the Political Science department till 1984. Sri Umesh Bhatta adorned the Department from 1963 to 1991. A very active and dynamic person, Mr. Apurba Kr Choudhury, joined the Department in 1962 and continued till 1993 until his sudden demise. Other notable former faculty members of the Department who contributed toward the growth of the Department were- Late Kiran Bhattacharya, Mrs Bina Kakati, Mrs Nibedita Lahkar and Dr Ranjita Bhattacharjya.

Present faculty members-
1) Dr Madhurima H. Choudhury (M.A; Ph.D)
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